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 “Conscience” was an election year catchphrase.  Secular and religious 
businesses came forward with objections of conscience to the Affordable 
Care Act’s requirement that employee health insurance plans cover 
contraception.  Going into the election season, some predicted that the 
Obama Administration’s refusal to exempt objecting employers—with the 
exception of houses of worship and a narrow array of religious 
organizations—from the contraception coverage benefit would cost the 
President votes among religious voters and Catholics in particular.1  In the 
* Associate Professor, Washington University School of Law.  My thanks to Peter
Wiedenbeck, Adam Rosenzweig, Pauline Kim, and Susan Appleton for their thoughtful 
comments.  I am grateful to Paul Trim, Alisha Johnson, and Brian Yagi for their always 
excellent research assistance.  I greatly appreciate the excellent editorial work and 
organizational efforts of the Journal staff. 
1.  Erik Eckholm, Both Sides Eager to Take Birth Control Coverage Issue to
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end, as an electoral matter, contraceptive coverage was much ado about 
nothing.  Attacks on contraception, which Americans overwhelmingly 
support and use, may even have aided the Democrats.2 
The controversy over conscience, however, has only just begun. 
Corporations—for-profit and non-profit, religiously affiliated and secular—
have filed more than seventy lawsuits challenging the contraception 
benefit.3  They claim that requiring a business to cover contraception 
within a comprehensive employer-based insurance plan violates the 
religious freedom of the business and its owners under the Free Exercise 
Clause of the Constitution and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA). 
I contend that a dangerous doctrine of “corporate conscience” may be 
born of the contraception controversy.  Already, a number of courts have 
indicated a willingness to accept that artificial business entities have 
religious beliefs and consciences that excuse them from compliance with 
law.4  In so doing, they repudiate longstanding foundations of corporate 
law.  They transform conscience, which is inherently human, into the 
province of business entities. 
Drawing on health law and policy, I argue that in accepting these 
challenges to mandated insurance benefits, courts misunderstand the nature 
of health benefits and the structure of the healthcare system in two 
fundamental ways.  First, employee benefits are a form of compensation, 
earned by and belonging to the employee like wages.  By neglecting this 
economic reality, courts draw incorrect conclusions about the legal and 
moral responsibility of employers for the contents of their employees’ 
Voters, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/02/16/us/politics/both-sides-eager-to-take-contraception-mandate-debate-to-
voters.html; Rachel Zoll, Analysis: Obama Contraceptive Mandate Has a Price, 
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
ap/financialnews/D9SPU3MO1.htm.  
2.  Ambreen Ali, Backlash Against Birth Control Mandate Might Aid President,
ROLL CALL (Feb. 8, 2012), available at 
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_92/Backlash-Against-Birth-Control-Mandate-
Might-Aid-President-212204-1.html. 
3.  Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, HHS Mandate Information Central,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2013); Ethan 
Bronner, A Flood of Suits on the Coverage of Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2013, 
at A1; Julie Rovner, Businesses Sue Government Over Birth Control Mandate, NPR, 
Jan. 11, 2013, http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/01/11/169136510/businesses-sue-
government-over-birth-control-mandate. 
4.  See, e.g., Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2013 WL 1014026, at *6 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 14, 2013); Tyndale v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 116-17 (D.D.C. 
2012). 
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insurance plans and thus about the burden that any regulation imposes. 
Employee use of benefits no more burdens employers than does their use of 
wages.  Second, the Affordable Care Act functions like other social 
insurance schemes, which require the employer to play an administrative 
and funding role.  Courts fail to acknowledge the social insurance function 
of recent health insurance reforms and, therefore, do not properly situate 
contraceptive challenges within the doctrinal tradition of religious 
objections to social insurance, which have typically failed. 
Finally, I suggest that successful challenges to healthcare reform based 
on corporate conscience would destabilize the rights of employees and of 
women, in particular, beyond the context of contraception.  Religiously 
affiliated commercial actors already assert rights to defy health and safety 
laws, pay women less, and fire pregnant women.  If secular employers 
succeed in their challenge to the contraception mandate, it will open the 
door to their assertions of similar rights, risking gender equality and 
religious freedom in all workplaces. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the contraception 
benefit rule and the legal challenges to the rule from secular, for-profit 
corporations.  Part II identifies a number of doctrinal and theoretical 
difficulties that the legal recognition of corporate conscience would create 
and that courts have largely elided.  Part III contends that courts have relied 
on the mistaken premise that employers pay for employer-based insurance, 
ignoring that employees receive benefits as a form of compensation, or 
deferred wages.  Part IV argues that the regulation of employer-based 
insurance, including the contraceptive mandate, should be understood as 
part and parcel of a comprehensive social insurance program, akin to 
worker’s compensation or social security, that workers pay into in the form 
of deferred wages and that employers administer.  A long line of precedent 
counsels skepticism toward religious objections to social insurance 
schemes.  Courts should evaluate the contraception challenges within this 
doctrinal framework and should, accordingly, resist granting relief from the 
contraception benefit rule to secular, for-profit corporations in the name of 
religious freedom.  Part IV warns that a doctrine of corporate conscience 
would negatively affect healthcare reform and employees’ rights far 
beyond contraception. 
I. CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE AND RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION 
With the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, 
Congress undertook to address the persistent problem of large numbers of 
uninsured people, improve the quality of health insurance, and confront 
high healthcare costs.  By the time of the 2012 election, the Supreme Court 
had settled the primary constitutional question around the ACA, holding 
3
Sepper: Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014
306 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 22:2 
that Congress had the authority to require individuals to carry insurance 
and, under certain circumstances, to expand Medicaid.5  Nonetheless, 
constitutional and statutory challenges to the ACA continue.  None have 
been as high profile as the claims that assert that requiring employer-based 
plans to include contraception violates the Free Exercise Clause or, 
somewhat more plausibly, RFRA.  This Section briefly reviews the 
contraception benefit rule and then describes the legal challenges it faces. 
A. The Contraception Benefit Rule 
In addition to expanding access to insurance, the Affordable Care Act 
more comprehensively regulates health insurance at the federal level.  It 
prohibits all health insurance plans from imposing lifetime and annual 
limits on the dollar amount of covered healthcare and from rescinding 
coverage, except in cases of fraud.6  As is most relevant here, across health 
plans, preventive care services must be covered without patient cost-
sharing, that is, copayments, coinsurance, or deductibles from patients.7 
With the ACA, Congress also mandated preventive care and screenings 
specific to women.8  In August 2011, based on a review of evidence-based 
preventive services for women’s health and well-being,9 the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services issued an interim final rule 
requiring insurance plans to cover contraceptives approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration as part of this mandate.10  The contraception benefit 
includes a range of contraceptive methods (oral contraceptives, intrauterine 
devices, emergency contraception, and sterilization) and patient counseling 
5.  See generally NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
6. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124
Stat. 130 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (2012)) (no annual or lifetime 
limits); Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124 Stat. 130 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12 
(2012)). 
7. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012)).
8.  Id.
9. The proposed services include counseling and screening for HIV, gestational
diabetes, and interpersonal and domestic violence.  INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS (July 19, 
2011), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Clinical-
Preventive-Services-for-Women-Closing-the-Gaps/preventiveservicesforwomenreport 
brief_updated2.pdf.  All recommended preventative health services were defined as 
measures “shown to improve well-being and/or decrease the likelihood or delay the 
onset of a targeted disease or condition.”  Id.  All of the IOM’s recommendations were 
subsequently incorporated into the final guidelines. 
10. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 46,621-01 (Aug. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
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and education about these options.11 
Out of sensitivity to religious concerns about contraception, the Obama 
Administration proposed an initial rule that exempted those religious 
employers that primarily employ and serve co-adherents.12  Modeled on 
state contraceptive coverage laws in New York and California among 
others, the rule would have entirely exempted those health plans 
established, maintained, or provided in connection with religious 
employers.13  It included no other religious accommodations. 
The rule and its religious employer exemption immediately sparked 
controversy.  Some religiously affiliated non-profits that were not covered 
by the exemption, such as universities, hospitals, social service providers, 
and insurance companies, characterized the rule as an affront to religious 
liberty.14  The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops insisted that the rule 
drew “a new distinction—alien to both [the] Catholic tradition and to 
federal law—between our houses of worship and our great ministries of 
service to our neighbors, namely, the poor, the homeless, the sick, the 
students in our schools and universities and others in need, of any faith 
community or none.”15  After sustained outcry, the Obama Administration 
announced a one-year safe harbor for religiously affiliated non-profits in 
order to develop a broader accommodation.16 
11.  Women’s Preventive Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines,
HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited 
June 19, 2013); see also FDA OFFICE OF WOMEN’S HEALTH, Birth Control: Medicines 
to Help You, http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForWomen/Free 
Publications/ucm313215.htm (last visited June 19, 2013).  
12. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 46,621-01. 
13.  Insurance Coverage for Contraception Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/insurance-
coverage-for-contraception-state-laws.aspx. 
14. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 8725-01, 8727 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (“These 
commenters included some religiously-affiliated educational institutions, healthcare 
organizations, and charities. Some . . . expressed concerns about paying for such 
services and stated that doing so would be contrary to their religious beliefs.”). 
15.  United for Religious Freedom, ADMIN. COMM. OF THE U.S. CONF. OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS  (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-
liberty/march-14-statement-on-religious-freedom-and-hhs-mandate.cfm.  
16. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet:
Women’s Preventive Services and Religious Institutions (Feb. 10, 2012), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/10/fact-sheet-women-s-
preventive-services-and-religious-institutions. 
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In February 2013, the Administration proposed a new rule.17  The rule 
continues to exempt “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions 
or associations of churches, as well as the exclusively religious activities of 
any religious order.”18  It also, however, accommodates a wide array of 
non-profit religious organizations, including hospitals and educational 
institutions.19  Under the rule, they may exclude contraceptive coverage 
from their employees’ insurance plans.  They need not be involved in 
“contracting, arranging, paying, or referring for [contraception] 
coverage.”20  Their employees, however, will still have access to 
contraceptive coverage.21  The obligation will fall on the employer’s 
insurance company to provide contraceptive coverage directly to 
employees (and their families for family plans) at no cost.22  A final rule 
implementing these accommodations was released in June of 2013.23 
As the rule makes clear, a wide berth has been given to religious mores 
related to contraception.  Like other areas of statutory law, the scheme of 
accommodation draws lines based on both the religious aspects and the 
commercial nature of the employer.24  Religious employers are exempted 
entirely; their employees need not have access to coverage for 
contraception.  Religiously affiliated non-profit employers may exclude 
contraception from the plans they contract for or pay into, but their 
17. Coverage of Preventive Services Under Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456 (Feb. 6, 2013). 
18.  Id. at 8461 (proposing to exempt an employer that is organized and operates as
a nonprofit entity and referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, which refers to churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions 
or associations of churches, as well as to the exclusively religious activities of any 
religious order). 
19.  Id. at 8462.
20.  Id.  The proposed rule achieves these same goals for self-insured non-profit
religious employers as well.  Id. at 8463-64.  Under the proposed rule, the employees of 
a non-profit religious employer will be able to access a third party insurance plan just 
for contraception coverage at no cost to them.  The third party insurance providers will 
be able to offset their additional costs by claiming an adjustment in Federally-
facilitated Exchange user fees. 
21.  Id. at 8462.
22.  Id. at 8465.
23. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., Administration Issues Final
Rules on Contraception Coverage and Religious Organizations (June 28, 2013), 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/06/20130628a.html. 
24.  See, e.g., SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD RELIGIOUS INSTS. PRACTICE GRP.,
RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER EXCEPTIONS: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE, available at 
http://www.sidley.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/final_religious%20institutions%20practice 
%20group.pdf (last visited June 19, 2013) (discussing religious employer exceptions to 
state employment anti-discrimination laws). 
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employees will have access under a separate policy provided by the 
insurance company or, if the employer self-insures, by a third-party 
administrator.  Finally, secular companies must comply with the 
contraception benefit; they may not employ religion as a shield. 
B. Legal Challenges to the Contraception Benefit 
In response to the proposed contraception rule, corporations—for-profit 
and non-profit, religiously affiliated and secular—have filed over seventy 
lawsuits.25  They claim, among other things, that the benefit violates their 
constitutional rights to free exercise, speech, and association.26  Primarily, 
however, they rely on RFRA.27  RFRA establishes that, even with regard to 
a rule of general applicability, the federal government may only 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion when the burden (1) is 
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.28  
Thus, the initial question before courts is whether a corporation (or its 
shareholders on behalf of the corporation) can exercise religious freedom 
and bring a claim under RFRA or the Free Exercise Clause.  If so, courts 
must consider whether the burden of the contraception benefit is 
substantial, and, if so, whether it can be justified as the least restrictive 
means of furthering a compelling government interest. 
Given the safe harbor for religiously affiliated organizations, courts have 
almost uniformly dismissed claims by universities, dioceses, and other 
religious non-profits for lack of standing and ripeness.29  Now, despite the 
accommodation granted to them, some religiously affiliated non-profit 
organizations have filed new suits—arguing that when the insurer 
separately contracts with an employer’s employees to cover contraception 
at no charge, contraceptive coverage remains part of the employer’s plan 
and is financed by it.30  The requirement to show that the law’s burden on 
25.  See, e.g., Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 3.
26.  See, e.g., Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1287 (W.D. Okla.
2012). 
27. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (a)-(b).
29.  See, e.g., Franciscan Univ. of Steubenville v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-CV-440,
2013 WL 1189854 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2013) (dismissing for lack of ripeness); 
Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Sebelius, 920 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1028 (E.D. Mo. 2013) 
(dismissing for lack of ripeness and lack of standing).  But see Geneva Coll. v. 
Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00207, 2013 WL 3071481 (W.D. Pa. June 18, 2013) (granting an 
injunction in favor of a religious organization admittedly covered by the proposed 
accommodation). 
30.  Bethany Monk, Take Action: American Family Association Files Lawsuit
Against HHS Mandate, CITIZENLINK (Feb. 25, 2013), 
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their religious freedom is substantial, however, is likely insurmountable for 
this category of plaintiff.  The accommodation effectively allows 
employers to avoid all but a de minimis connection to the alleged 
wrongdoing.  Employers’ contracted-for plans will not include 
contraception.  Nor will employers pay for the additional coverage since 
the contraception benefit is at worst cost-neutral.31  That is, a plan that 
covers contraception will not result in higher premiums and may in fact 
reduce overall plan costs.32  Given the insubstantiality of any burden, courts 
should continue to dismiss these claims. 
The bulk of the litigation has focused, not on religiously affiliated 
employers, but on secular, for-profit corporations.  To be clear, the 
contraceptive challengers are not mom and pop shops. Because the ACA 
only applies to large employers, they are, by definition, large employers of 
fifty or more full-time employees.  They range from food processing 
companies with 400 employees33 to craft stores with 13,000 employees.34  
Some employers challenge the full scope of the contraception benefit, 
including oral contraceptives and sterilization.35  Others accept the moral 
permissibility of contraception generally, but claim that emergency 
contraception, such as Plan B, is an abortifacient.36  Advocacy 
organizations, such as the Alliance Defending Freedom and the Becket 
Fund for Religious Liberty, often represent these companies in court.37  In 
similar fashion, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops continues to 
criticize the proposed rule for refusing “to acknowledge conscience rights 
of business owners who operate their businesses according to their faith 
http://www.citizenlink.com/2013/02/25/take-action-american-family-association-files-
lawsuit-against-hhs-mandate/ (“The new proposed HHS rule misleads faith-based 
groups and all Americans into believing they will no longer have to violate their faith 
and provide objectionable insurance for birth control and abortion-inducing drugs.”). 
31.  Alex Wayne, Critics Want More Exemptions from U.S. Birth-Control Rule,
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-02-
01/religious-nonprofits-won-t-pay-for-birth-control-u-dot-s-dot-says. 
32.  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF, THE COST OF
COVERING CONTRACEPTIVES THROUGH HEALTH INSURANCE 1-2 (Feb. 2012), 
http:///aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2012/contraceptives/ib.shtml. 
33. Gilardi v. Sebelius, No. 13-104, 2013 WL 781150, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 3,
2013). 
34. Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
35.  See, e.g., Gilardi, 2013 WL 781150, at *2.
36.  See, e.g., Tyndale v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 112 (D.D.C. 2012).
37. See The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 3; Legal Actions
Against Obamacare, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, 
http://www.alliancedefendingfreedom.org/page/ObamaCare/learn-more (last visited 
June 19, 2013). 
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and moral values.”38 
The argument made by for-profit employers boils down to this:  the 
Affordable Care Act forces the employer to provide insurance coverage 
and to pay, through its insurance plan, for healthcare (in this case 
contraception) to which it objects as a matter of religion.  Challengers 
argue that “they face a stark dilemma: either comply with the contraceptive 
coverage requirement, and violate their religious convictions, or refuse to 
comply, and face ruinous penalties.”39  The lawsuits assert two theories: 
(1) the corporation exercises religion as an independent legal entity, and (2) 
shareholders use the corporation as an instrument to express their own 
beliefs, such that the corporation is indistinguishable from its owners.  As 
RFRA requires, plaintiff corporations and shareholders contend that their 
exercise of religion is substantially burdened because “they must facilitate, 
subsidize, and encourage the use of goods and services that they sincerely 
believe are immoral or suffer severe penalties.”40  They further claim that 
the government has no compelling interest in ensuring that health plans 
include contraceptive coverage.41  Finally, they argue, the regulation of 
employer-based plans is not the least restrictive means to achieve any 
compelling interest.42 
Courts have considered dozens of motions for preliminary injunctions 
from these for-profit, secular corporations.43  Thus far, in the majority of 
cases, courts have held that secular, for-profit corporations (or their 
owners) are likely to succeed on the merits of their religious freedom 
claims and have enjoined operation of the contraception benefit against 
them.44  A circuit split has emerged between the Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. 
38. Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, HHS Proposal Falls Short
in Meeting Church Concerns; Bishops Look Forward to Addressing Issues with 
Administration (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-037.cfm. 
39. Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-CV-1096, 2012 WL 6845677, at *3
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2012). 
40. Gilardi, 2013 WL 781150, at *4.  For a list of some of the for-profit companies
challenging the contraceptive coverage mandate, see Katie J.M. Baker, Meet the 18 
For-Profit Companies Fighting Obamacare’s Contraception Coverage, JEZEBEL (Feb. 
7, 2013, 12:05 PM), http://jezebel.com/5982261/meet-the-12-for+profit-companies-
against-obamacares-contraception-coverage?tag=pill-baby-pill. 
41. Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 993 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
42.  Legatus, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 995; Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287,
1298 (D. Colo. 2012). 
43. Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00207, 2013 WL 838238, at *10 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 6, 2013). 
44. See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, Nos. 12-3841 & 13-1077, 2013 WL 5, at *2 (7th
Cir. Nov. 8, 2013); Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1294; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012). 
9
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Circuits, which have sided with challengers, and the Third and Sixth 
Circuits, which have refused to enjoin the contraception benefit.45 
Generally speaking, courts granting preliminary injunctions to 
contraceptive challengers reason as follows.  First, they admit the difficulty 
of finding that a for-profit company itself exercises religion.  Some cite the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission46 as potential support for the “independent First Amendment 
right to free exercise of religion” of a for-profit company that, for example, 
sells  power system equipment.47  Alternatively, courts decline to determine 
that corporations have rights under the First Amendment or RFRA but, 
through judicial sleight of hand, find that a corporation and its owners are 
coextensive.48  For example, regarding a for-profit corporation that 
publishes religious books and Bibles, one court said, “[W]hen the beliefs of 
a closely-held corporation and its owners are inseparable, the corporation 
should be deemed the alter-ego of its owners for religious purposes.”49  
Having announced that the corporation is an embodiment of the owner and 
her beliefs, these courts decide that requiring the corporation to cover 
contraception or face financial consequences constitutes a substantial 
burden on the religious freedom of the owners of the corporation.50  
45. Korte, 2013 WL 6757353, at *2; Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., No. 13-5069, 2013 WL 5854246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2013); Autocam Corp. v. 
Sebelius, No. 12-2673, 2013 WL 5182544 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2013); Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 13-1144, 2013 WL 
3845365 (3d Cir. July 26, 2013); Hobby Lobby, 2012 WL 6930302. 
46.  See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
47. Beckwith Elec. Co., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 8:13-cv-0648-T-17MAP, 2013 WL
3297498, at *8 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 2013) (“[T]here is nothing to suggest that the right 
to exercise religion, which immediately precedes the right to free speech in the First 
Amendment, was intended to treat any form of the ‘corporate personhood,’ including 
corporations, sole proprietorships and partnerships, any differently than it treats 
individuals.  To write into the text of the First Amendment such a distinction, 
especially when there seems to be no evidence that such a distinction mattered to the 
Framers, would seem to be in conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in Citizens 
United.”); see also Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3.  Contra Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 2013 WL 
1277419, No. 5-12-cv-06744 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2013) (concluding that secular, for-profit 
corporations do not have free exercise rights). 
48.  Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3 (finding that corporate form is not dispositive
because the individual plaintiffs would violate their religious beliefs if the corporation 
had to comply with the mandate); Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2013 WL 
1014026, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar.14, 2013) (adopting the alter ego theory). 
49. Tyndale v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117 (D.D.C. 2012).
50.  Id.  (“[C]ourts must consider the rights of the owners as the basis for the [f]ree
[e]xercise claim brought by the corporation, even if the regulation technically applies 
only to the corporation.”) (emphasis in original).   
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Finally, some courts express skepticism that the government has 
compelling interests in expanding access to contraception;51 others 
conclude that the government has not shown the contraception benefit rule 
is the least restrictive means to accomplish the interests.52  Instead, they 
say, the government could directly fund and provide contraception itself.53 
By contrast, other courts have refused to enjoin the contraception benefit 
with regard to private corporations.54  They answer the question of whether 
any secular, for-profit corporation can exercise religion in the negative.55  
For example, the Gilardi v. Sebelius district court determined that secular 
companies “are engaged in purely commercial conduct and do not exercise 
religion.”56 
51. See, e.g., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-5069, 2013
WL 5854246, at *11 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2013) (“‘[S]afeguarding public health’ seems 
too broadly formulated to satisfy the compelling interest test.”); Beckwith Elec. Co., 
Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 8:13-cv-0648-T-17MAP, 2013 WL 3297498, at *17 (M.D. Fla. 
June 25, 2013) (“The Court is not particularly persuaded by the government’s evidence 
to support its compelling interest.  For example, there is no empirical data or other 
evidence . . . that would support the conclusion that the provision of the FDA-approved 
emergency contraceptives (in addition to the contraceptives to which plaintiffs do not 
object) would result in fewer unintended pregnancies.”). 
52. Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 855 (7th Cir. 2013) (granting an injunction
for a privately held and family run company with 1,148 full time employees engaged in 
the manufacturing vehicle safety systems in large part because the government “has not 
demonstrated that requiring religious objectors to provide cost free contraception 
coverage is the least restrictive means of increasing access to contraception”).   
53. Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1298-99 (D. Colo. 2012) (holding
that the government will need to disprove that “government provision of free birth 
control” is an alternative). 
54. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394 (E.D. Pa.
2013); Briscoe v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-00285-WYD-BNB, 2013 WL 755413 (D. Colo. 
Feb. 27, 2013); Gilardi v. Sebelius, No. 13-104, 2013 WL 781150 (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 
2013), rev’d Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-5069, 2013 WL 
5854246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2013); Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1677, 2013 
WL 5745858 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 2013); MK Chambers Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., No. 13-11379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47887 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 
2013); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-CV-1096, 2012 WL 6845677 (W.D. Mich. 
Dec. 24, 2012); O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 
1149, 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012). 
55.  See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of U.S. Dept. of
Health and Human Serv., 2013 WL 1277419, No. 5-12-cv-06744 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 
2013); Briscoe v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-00285, 2013 WL 755413, at *5 (D. Colo. Feb. 
27, 2013). 
56.  Gilardi, 2013 WL 781150, at *7, rev’d Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., No. 13-5069, 2013 WL 5854246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2013); Autocam, 
2012 WL 6845677, at *4 (expressing skepticism at the possibility that for-profit 
corporations could exercise religion without deciding). 
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Nor do these courts accept the argument that the shareholders’ beliefs 
can be imputed to the corporation.  They reason that it is well-established 
in corporate law that the corporation is not equivalent to its owners.  One 
district court observed that:  
[t]he mandate does not compel the [owners] as individuals to do 
anything.  They do not have to use or buy contraceptives for themselves 
or anyone else.  It is only the legally separate entities they currently own 
that have any obligation under the mandate.  The law protects that 
separation between the corporation and its owners.57   
These courts conclude that it is the corporation, not the owners, that 
sponsors a health plan (itself a distinct legal entity) and bears the burden of 
ACA regulations.58  They further decide that any burden on the owners’ 
free exercise is attenuated—separated from the contested act by the 
corporate form in the first instance and by the autonomous decision of the 
employee in the second.59  Even assuming a substantial burden on the 
owners (or corporate entity), these courts hold that the government has 
compelling interests in the contraception benefit and is not required to set 
up a government-provided and funded contraception system to meet 
them.60 
At heart, federal courts manifest a fundamental disagreement over 
whether a for-profit corporation can exercise religion, either as a 
constitutional or statutory matter.  They further diverge over whether 
shareholders can employ the corporate form to exercise their own religious 
57.  Autocam, 2012 WL 6845677, at *7; see also Gilardi, 2013 WL 781150, at *9
(“[T]he regulations are imposed on the . . . corporations, not the owners, and the 
corporate form cannot be disregarded on the ground that the corporations are the 
owners’ ‘alter egos,’ such that any burden is indirect.”); Grote, 708 F.3d at 858 
(Rovner, J., dissenting) (“[S]o long as the business’s liabilities are not the 
[shareholders’] liabilities—which is the primary and ‘invaluable privilege’ conferred 
by the corporate form—neither are the business’s expenditures the [shareholders’] own 
expenditures.”).  
58.  Grote, 708 F.3d at 857 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
59.  Id. at 858; see also Hobby Lobby, 2012 WL 6930302, at *3 (“[T]he particular
burden of which plaintiffs complain is that funds, which plaintiffs will contribute to a 
group health plan, might, after a series of independent decisions by healthcare 
providers and patients covered by the plan, subsidize someone else’s participation in an 
activity that is condemned by plaintiffs’ religion.”); Conestoga, 2013 WL 140110, at 
*414-15 (noting that “[a] series of events must first occur before the actual use of an
abortifacient would come into play”). 
60.  See, e.g., Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 997 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
(“Plaintiffs’ alternative prospect of establishing a separate agency whose purpose 
would be to provide contraception to women raises a host of administrative and 
logistical problems, well pointed-out by the Government’s response, and does not 
appear practical.”). 
12
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss2/4
2014] THE BIRTH OF CORPORATE CONSCIENCE 315
beliefs, essentially piercing the corporate veil when it is in the 
shareholders’ own interest.  Ultimately, decisions on the contraception 
benefit expose a fundamental split over central questions of religious 
liberty and the role of the corporation in our society. 
II. THE BIRTH OF A DOCTRINE OF CORPORATE CONSCIENCE?
In the contraception context, claims of corporate free exercise are 
coming fast and furious.  I suggest that we may be witnessing the birth of a 
doctrine of “corporate conscience.”  In this Part, I raise some concerns 
about what such a doctrine might mean. 
Faced with contraceptive challenges, several courts now hold that a 
secular, for-profit corporation has a right to exercise religion under the Free 
Exercise Clause and RFRA, entitling it to exemptions from business 
regulation.61  Many more dodge the ultimate question of whether 
corporations themselves can exercise religion, but indicate a willingness to 
accept that artificial business entities have religious beliefs and consciences 
that excuse them from compliance with law.62  In so doing, these courts 
seem receptive to an unprecedented expansion of corporate personhood that 
pushes the limits of recent jurisprudential shifts toward increased 
institutional freedoms, as in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission.63  Just as Citizens United’s establishment of a constitutional 
right to corporate political speech raised a host of thorny questions64 
(although that context at least involved the prior existence of corporate 
speech), so too would “corporate conscience” present perplexing legal and 
philosophical questions.  How can a business have beliefs, religious or 
otherwise?  What does it mean for a business to hold a faith?  How, as 
courts now ponder, can a corporation exercise religion?65  How does it 
show sincerity?  Can a single-minded obligation to maximize profits meld 
61.  See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 2012 WL 6930302; Korte v. Sebelius, Nos. 12-3841 &
13-1077, 2013 WL 5, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 8, 2013); Beckwith Elec. Co., Inc. v. 
Sebelius, No. 8:13-cv-0648-T-17MAP, 2013 WL 3297498 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 2013). 
62.  See, e.g., Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2013 WL 1014026, at *3-6
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2013); Tyndale v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117 (D.D.C. 
2012). 
63.  See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
64. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech:  Who
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 86 (2010) (raising a number of these questions that 
arise because a “corporation, after all, is not a natural, Platonic entity” but a “legal 
arrangement”). 
65.  See, e.g., Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296 (D. Colo. 2012);
Autocam, 2012 WL 6845677, at *4 (observing that “[a] corporation cannot, for 
example, attend worship services or otherwise participate in the sacraments and rites of 
the church, as individuals do”). 
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with religious devotion? 
The federal judiciary’s receptiveness to religious freedom for the for-
profit business community is unprecedented.  Although corporations have 
some constitutional rights, their rights are not coextensive with those of 
individuals.66  In starkly rejecting corporate Free Exercise, one court 
explained, “[R]eligious belief takes shape within the minds and hearts of 
individuals, and its protection is one of the more uniquely ‘human’ rights 
provided by the Constitution.”67  Nor do corporations necessarily have the 
same statutory rights that individuals do.68  RFRA extends protection to 
“persons,” which could be read to apply to artificial persons.69  But the 
statute was intended to restore the constitutional strict scrutiny standard for 
review of religious liberty claims that the Supreme Court rejected in 
Employment Division v. Smith,70 rather than expand religious liberty to for-
profit businesses.71  Ultimately, protecting corporate free exercise—
whether directly from the corporation or indirectly from shareholders—
runs counter to our intuitions that individual claims of conscience are 
66. For instance, corporations do not have a Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.  United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 5 (1970).  With regard to the 
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has determined that “[w]hile they may and 
should have protection from unlawful demands made in the name of public 
investigation . . . corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment 
of a right to privacy.”  U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651 (1950). 
67.  Conestoga, 2013 WL 140110, at *7.
68.  See, e.g., Fed. Comm. Comm’n v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1177 (2011)
(holding that corporations do not have a right of personal privacy for purposes of the 
Freedom of Information Act). 
69. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1993)
(“Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering 
that compelling governmental interest.”). 
70. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990) (holding that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the 
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes)’”). 
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)-1 (stating that purpose of RFRA is “to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases 
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened”); S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 9; 
H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 5-6 (1993); 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1898 (“This bill is not a 
codification of the result reached in any prior free exercise decision but rather the 
restoration of the legal standard that was applied in those decisions. Therefore, the 
compelling interest test generally should not be construed more stringently or more 
leniently than it was prior to Smith.”). 
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morally superior to those of institutional structures.  In our pluralist society, 
this is often the way the law approaches issues of conviction—for example, 
allowing individuals, but rarely institutions, to discriminate.72 
In addition to equating the institution to the individual, the new corporate 
conscience would tear apart the distinction that constitutional and statutory 
law has drawn between secular for-profits and religious commercial 
organizations.73  Although the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC seems to put institutional interests over 
individual rights, the decision still distinguishes between churches and 
secular entities.74  Moreover, even religiously affiliated organizations are 
not generally entitled to defy employment-related laws on the ground of 
free exercise; only in certain circumstances may they discriminate in favor 
of co-adherents of their faith.75 
Treating corporate free exercise as derivative of the owners’ beliefs does 
not solidify the doctrinal move toward for-profit conscience.  Corporations, 
as conglomerate entities, exist indefinitely and independently of their 
shareholders.76  They carry out acts and affect individual lives, and have an 
72.  Michael A. Rie, Defining the Limits of Institutional Moral Agency in Health
Care:  A Response to Kevin Wildes, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 221, 223 (1991). 
73.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2010) (allowing religious organizations to
“give employment preference to members of their own religion” as an accommodation 
to Title VII); Kelly Catherine Chapman, Note, Gay Rights, the Bible, and Public 
Accommodations:  An Empirical Approach to Religious Exemptions for Holdout States, 
100 GEO. L.J. 1783, 1789-90 (2012) (“States that currently have such [sexual 
orientation antidiscrimination] statutes generally have minimal religious exemptions . . 
. . These include exemptions for actual places of religious worship, the organizations 
they operate, and certain private organizations.”). 
74. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct.
694, 699 (2012) (“The question presented is whether the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment bar such an action when the employer is a 
religious group and the employee is one of the group’s ministers.”) (emphasis added). 
75.  See, e.g., Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378
(1990) (state sales and use taxes); Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) 
(federal wage and overtime recordkeeping requirements); U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 
(1982) (social security); United States v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d 627 
(7th Cir. 2000) (unemployment tax systems); E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian School, 
781 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1986) (“While . . . religious institutions may base 
relevant hiring decisions upon religious preferences, religious employers are not 
immune from liability [under Title VII] for discrimination based on . . . sex. 
Furthermore, Congress and this court have specifically rejected proposals that provide 
religious employers a complete exemption from regulation under the [Civil Rights] Act 
[of 1964].”); St. John’s Lutheran Church v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 830 P.2d 1271, 
1271 (Mont. 1992) (workers’ compensation laws); Victory Baptist Temple, Inc. v. 
Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 442 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). 
76. Peter A. French, Collective Responsibility and the Practice of Medicine, 7 J. OF
15
Sepper: Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014
318 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 22:2 
identity that is larger than their constituent parts.  Walmart is Walmart, 
even when Sam Walton resigns.77  The very goal of the corporate form is to 
separate the person from the entity, shielding the person from obligation 
and liability and ensuring that the entity focuses on profit maximization.78  
As the Supreme Court has noted, “incorporation’s basic purpose is to create 
a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges 
different from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it, 
or whom it employs.”79 
While corporate law makes clear that corporations and their shareholders 
are separate entities, in the current context courts advance a concept of the 
corporation as a means by which individuals express moral judgments 
about contraception.  Individuals, as the argument goes, recognize that their 
religious beliefs may be best carried out through the corporate form, such 
that any regulation of a corporation represents a potential burden on the 
religious exercise by its shareholders. 
This “corporation as shareholder alter ego” rationale deals a blow to the 
separateness of corporations in corporate law doctrine.  As the Conestoga 
Woods court said, “[t]he owners of an LLC or corporation, even a closely-
held one, have an obligation to respect the corporate form, on pain of losing 
the benefits of that form should they fail to do so. The fact that one person 
owns all of the stock does not make him and the corporation one and the 
same person, nor does he thereby become the owner of all the property of 
the corporation.  [Conestoga’s owners] chose to incorporate and conduct 
business through Conestoga, thereby obtaining both the advantages and 
disadvantages of the corporate form.”80  Allowing owners to subvert the 
corporate form, by contrast, represents an enormous shift in corporate law. 
Even if the doctrine were limited to closely held or privately held 
MED. & PHIL. 65, 72-75 (1982). 
77.  Id. at 74-75.
78. Cedric Kushner Promotions v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001) (concluding
that under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the president and 
sole shareholder of a corporation is not the same person as the corporation and making 
the point that “linguistically speaking” and as a matter of corporate law “[t]he corporate 
owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally 
different entity with different rights and responsibilities due to its different legal 
status”). 
79.  Id. at 163.
80. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013); Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 858 (7th Cir. 
2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Grotes are not at liberty to treat the company’s 
bank accounts as their own; co-mingling personal and corporate funds is a classic sign 
that a company owner is disregarding the corporate form and treating the business as 
his alter ego.”). 
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corporations, between eighty percent and ninety percent of companies fall 
into this category; they employ sixty-two percent of all employees.81 
The alter ego notion generates further practical and doctrinal 
complexities.  Presuming the shareholders or owners share the same 
position on contraception use, they may not do so on all issues.  Even 
adherents of the same religion often disagree over the application of 
universal rules in specific cases.  Indeed, identifying the institutional 
position on moral questions can be difficult in those religious institutions 
with hierarchical structures, let alone in pluralistic, profit-seeking 
commercial entities.82  In the case of disagreeing shareholders, whose 
beliefs matter?  And what of employees who may not share the owners’ 
beliefs? 
Exempting employers from the contraception mandate (or other social 
insurance) would permit corporate owners to interfere with their 
employees’ varied religious beliefs.  Solely because they own capital, a 
small minority of people could effectively block access to insurance 
coverage for contraception, or any other healthcare it deems objectionable, 
for a majority of employees.  Some owners, such as those of the HVAC 
manufacturing company Hercules, suggest that their company is openly 
religious, and its perspective does not unfairly surprise its employees.83  In 
this sense, they characterize the employer-employee relationship as a 
voluntary association.  If, however, the employees truly do share in the 
company’s values, then the burden of covering contraception would be 
non-existent.  Only theoretically would the insurance plan be used to 
purchase contraception; in practice, the employees would never use it in 
such a way, because they share their employer’s beliefs.  The employer 
could contract for and finance a health insurance plan that covers 
contraception without any risk of moral wrongdoing at all. 
These difficult corporate, religious freedom, and employment law 
questions arise with respect to any doctrine of corporate conscience.  Yet, 
courts have not fully considered the wide-ranging effects of this shift across 
81.  WILLIAM PATTERSON UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES,
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES, available at 
www.wpunj.edu/CloselyHeld/EconomicImpact.dot (last visited March 27, 2013). 
82.  See Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring Discrimination in the Same-Sex Marriage
Debates, 89 IND. L.J (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2279040 (analyzing conflict within Catholic Charities of 
Boston over placement of children with gay foster parents); Elizabeth Sepper, Taking 
Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1543 (2012) (discussing instances of 
disagreement between religious officials within the same religion over the morality of 
medical care). 
83. Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (D. Colo. 2012).
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doctrines.  Just as significantly, courts have based their decisions on a 
misunderstanding of the employer’s role in the healthcare system and the 
government interests at stake, which the next sections take up. 
III. MISUNDERSTANDING THE WAGE-HEALTH INSURANCE TRADE OFF AND
THE INSUBSTANTIAL BURDEN OF INSURANCE REGULATION 
When granting injunctions against the contraception benefit, courts 
typically ignore the economic reality that employee benefits are a form of 
compensation, like wages earned by and belonging to the employee.  They 
thus overstate the economic burden on employees and, in turn, 
misunderstand the religious freedom analysis.  If, as is generally agreed, 
employees’ use of wages to purchase products of which their employers 
disapprove cannot constitute a substantial burden on the employer’s 
religion, their use of benefits is similarly insubstantial.  By failing to 
identify the tradeoff between wages and benefits in employee 
compensation, courts incorrectly conclude that employers bear 
responsibility, legal and moral, for the contents of their employees’ 
insurance plans and consequently are burdened by regulation. 
Challengers argue that the contraceptive mandate forces them, and/or the 
corporation they own, “to pay for, provide, facilitate, or otherwise support 
contraception.”84  These concerns range from the immediate to the mediate 
to the highly attenuated (the use of, purchase of, contracting for a plan that 
covers, and offering a plan that covers contraception). Although the 
Seventh Circuit described the burden as “the coerced coverage of 
contraception, abortifacients, sterilization, and related services, not—or 
perhaps more precisely, not only—in the later purchase or use of 
contraception or related services,”85 this description cannot be quite 
accurate.  Having a plan that covers contraception but will never be used 
for contraception, such that no wrongdoing ever occurs, cannot impose a 
substantial burden on religious freedom.  Instead, although there is some 
fluidity in their objections, challengers seem most concerned with the risk 
that the plan will be used to purchase contraception. 
Irrespective of how these claims are understood, any inquiry into the 
burden of contraceptive coverage on the employer should consider the 
nature of employee benefits generally and health insurance specifically.  A 
closer examination of employee benefits helps clarify the burden that 
regulating those benefits might impose and puts into perspective the 
84. Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2013 WL 1014026, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 14, 2013). 
85. Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3 (7th Cir. Dec. 28,
2012). 
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employer’s responsibility for, or link to, the objectionable act—in this case, 
the purchase or use of contraception. 
Economic theory and empirical work instructs that employees earn a 
total package of compensation that includes wages and benefits, ranging 
from vacation days to worker’s compensation.86  Workers trade off wages 
for benefits, preferring different wage-benefit mixes depending on age, 
health status, and other individual factors.87  The wage-insurance tradeoff, 
also known as the “compensating wage theory,” predicts a proportionate 
and inverse relationship between wages and health benefits.88  Therefore, as 
courts have observed, depriving workers of employee benefits amounts to 
reducing their pay.89 
Employer-based health insurance is no different.  Workers earn benefits 
and wages that together constitute a total compensation package.  Since 
2013, employees’ W-2s have made this clear:  the total annual premium 
paid toward health insurance and wages are reported.90 
Workers’ wages fall as the employer’s health insurance expenditures 
rise.  Indeed, rising healthcare costs are widely viewed as the primary 
driver of flat—or decreasing—real wages for employees in the United 
States.91  As one CEO explained recently in the pages of the New York 
86.  See generally Sherwin Rosen, The Theory of Equalizing Differences, in
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 641 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & Richard Layard, eds. 
1986); Walter W. Kolodrubetz, Two Decades of Employee Benefit Plans, 1950-1970: A 
Review, 35 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 10 (1972). 
87.  See, e.g., Richard D. Miller Jr., Estimating the Compensating Differential for
Employer-Provided Health Insurance, 4 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FINANCE & ECON. 27, 
27 (2004) (finding a compensating differential for health insurance equal to 10% to 
11%  of wages); Bradley R. Schiller & Randall D. Weiss, Pensions and Wages: A Test 
for Equalizing Differences, 62 REV. ECON. & STAT. 529 (1980) (finding wage tradeoff 
for pension plans); Stephen A. Woodbury, Substitution Between Wage and Nonwage 
Benefits, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 166, 166 (1983) (showing that young workers, age 16-34, 
receive a higher percentage of salary versus nonwage benefits). 
88.  See generally Craig A. Olson, Do Workers Accept Lower Wages in Exchange
for Health Benefits?, 20 J. LABOR ECON. 91, 91 (2002) (“Holding human capital and 
other variables influencing wages constant, workers who receive more generous fringe 
benefits are paid a lower wage than comparable workers who prefer fewer fringe 
benefits.”). 
89.  When considering the denial of spousal benefits to same-sex domestic
partners, the Alaska Supreme Court framed the issue as whether one group of workers 
could be paid less than their similarly situated co-workers.  Alaska Civil Liberties 
Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 783 (Alaska 2005). 
90. 26 U.S.C. § 6051(a)(14) (2012).
91.  David Leonhardt, How a Tax Can Cut Health Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/.2009/09/30/business/economy/30leonhardt.html; Paul 
van de Water, Excise Tax on Very High Cost Plans Is a Sound Element of Health 
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Times, his company pays thousands of dollars in an employee’s healthcare 
costs that might otherwise go to her salary; he continued, “From my point 
of view as a chief executive of a company, healthcare is just a different 
form of compensation.”92   
Although researchers disagree on the magnitude of this trade-off, studies 
confirm a negative relationship between wages and benefits.93  As is 
particularly relevant, a study of Massachusetts’ health insurance reform, 
which the ACA largely mirrors, uncovered an almost dollar-for-dollar 
relationship between the cost of health benefits to the employer and the 
corresponding fall in wages.94  Employees paid almost the full cost of 
health insurance through lower wages (or an average of $6,058 less, nearly 
exactly the cost of annual health insurance premiums).95 
The origins of employer-based health insurance further confirm that it 
serves as compensation.  During World War II, employers faced a shortage 
of workers and a federal freeze on wages.96  With benefits exempted from 
the definition of wages by the War Labor Board, for the first time on a 
grand scale companies began to offer their employees health insurance in 
order to increase total compensation.97  During and immediately after 
World War II, enrollment in private health insurance skyrocketed.98  
Employers’ role in the healthcare system was cemented by the continued 
Reform, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Nov. 10, 2009), 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2957. 
92. David Goldhill, Op-Ed, The Health Benefits That Cut Your Pay, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/opinion/sunday/the-health-
benefits-that-cut-your-pay.html. 
93.  See, e.g., Craig A. Olson, Do Workers Accept Lower Wages in Exchange for
Health Benefits?, 20 J. LABOR ECON. 91, 93 (2002) (finding that the average married 
woman who moved from a job without health benefits to a job with health benefits 
accepted a wage reduction of about 20 percent); Miller Jr., supra note 87, at 27 
(reporting that male workers between 25 and 55 who lost their employer-sponsored 
health benefits were compensated with roughly a 10 to 11 percent increase in wages).  
94. Jonathan T. Kolstad & Amanda E. Kowalski, Mandate-Based Health Reforms
and the Labor Market: Evidence From the Massachusetts Reform, 26 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper 17933, Mar. 2012), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17933.pdf?new_window=1. 
95.  Id. at 29.
96.  Melissa A. Thomasson, From Sickness to Health: The Twentieth-Century
Development of U.S. Health Insurance, 39 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 233, 240 
(2002). 
97.  PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 311
(1982) (describing employer-based insurance as “a functional substitute for social 
insurance, which is built on employee relations for much the same reasons” (reduction 
of administrative expense and focus on healthy)). 
98.  Id. at 313.
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preferential tax treatment of health insurance.99  Unlike wages on which 
employees pay taxes, employer-based health insurance is free of income 
taxes and subject to reduced payroll taxes.100 
Therefore, each employee’s actual “salary” is wages plus the employer 
share of the health insurance premium.  That employers provide the 
structure through which financing is delivered does not change the fact that 
employees, not employers, ultimately pay for health insurance premiums. 
At present, employees who receive health insurance through work pay an 
average of 8.6% of their gross income for that insurance, primarily in the 
form of foregone wages.101  Employees also pay a portion of health 
insurance premiums directly, essentially moving additional compensation 
from wages to benefits.102  Some plans even involve health savings 
accounts, which allow employees to direct a portion of pre-tax wages to 
pay for healthcare not covered by their insurance.103 
Why does the wage-benefit tradeoff matter for analysis of free exercise 
claims?  The law does not accommodate every assertion of religious 
liberty, but rather evaluates burdens along a scale between directness and 
attenuation.  Plaintiffs in the contraception litigation acknowledge that their 
employees’ purchase of contraception with wages does not represent a 
burden on the employers’ free exercise.104  The burden on either the 
99. Thomas Bodenheimer et al., How Large Employers Are Shaping the Health
Care Marketplace: First of Two Parts, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1003, 1003 (1998); 
David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 
2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 23, 25 (2001). 
 100.  Peter Wiedenbeck, Taxes and Healthcare, 124 TAX NOTES 889, 891-92 (2009) 
(noting that employer payments under a plan are exempt from Social Security and 
Medicare taxes); I.R.C. § 106 (1958) (“Gross income does not include contributions by 
the employer to accident or health plans for compensation (through insurance or 
otherwise) to his employees for personal injuries or sickness.”); see also BOB LYKE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34767, THE TAX EXCLUSION FOR EMP’R-PROVIDED
HEALTH INS.: POLICY ISSUES REGARDING THE REPEAL DEBATE 3, 7-9 (2008). 
 101.  Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1617 n.176 (2011). 
 102.  Medical Expenditure Panel Survey: 2011 Survey Results, AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, available at 
http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/quick_tables_results.jsp?component=2&subc
omponent=1&year=2011&tableSeries=-1&tableSubSeries=&searchText=&searchMeth 
od=1&Action=Search (last visited June 21, 2013) (Tables I.C.1, I.C.2, I.D.1, I.D.2). 
 103.  Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-CV-1096, 2012 WL 6845677, at *6 
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2012). 
 104.  Id. at *6 (“Plaintiffs do not seek to control what an employee or his or her 
dependents do with the wages and healthcare dollars we provide. Our employees are 
free to make decisions with their money—including the funds in their personal health 
savings account—that we do not agree with.”). 
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corporation or its owners is too attenuated, irrespective of how morally 
reprehensible the employer finds the employees’ purchases.  The 
employer’s role is delinked by virtue of the employee’s decision about how 
to use the wages. 
Benefits function in much the same way.  In evaluating the effect of the 
contraceptive mandate on free exercise, as Judge Rovner of the Seventh 
Circuit said, “it is worth considering whether the burden is different in kind 
from the burden of knowing that an employee might be using his or her [] 
paycheck (or money in a healthcare reimbursement account) to pay for 
contraception him or herself.”105  Courts that have rejected challenges to 
the contraception benefit have recognized that benefits and wages have 
“virtually no functional difference” and “involve the same economic 
exchange at the corporate level:  employees will earn a wage or benefit 
with their labor, and money originating from [the employer] will pay for 
it.”106  When a corporation purchases a health insurance plan that its 
employees (and their family members) may or may not use to buy 
contraception, it no more pays for contraception than it does when 
employees use their wages to buy it.  Unless how employees spend their 
wages also burdens an employer’s liberty, how employees use their 
insurance benefits must be similarly insubstantial. 
One might nonetheless argue that wages do not require employers to 
structure and contract for coverage the way health insurance does.  As the 
next section shows, our social insurance system regularly relies on 
employers to take on an administrative and contributory role, irrespective 
of their religious objections. 
IV. SITUATING THE CONTRACEPTIVE LITIGATION WITHIN THE DOCTRINAL
FRAMEWORK OF FREE EXERCISE CHALLENGES TO SOCIAL INSURANCE 
Religious challenges to the contraception benefit take place within the 
context of healthcare reform and, more broadly, our social insurance 
system.  The Affordable Care Act aims to establish near-universal access to 
a baseline of affordable and adequate coverage.  Preventive services 
function as an important component of insurance access and population-
wide health promotion.  Yet, as a basic overview of the health insurance 
105.  Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 861 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 106.  Autocam Corp., 2012 WL 6845677, at *6 (“[I]n neither situation do the wages 
and benefits earned pay—directly or indirectly—for contraception products and 
services unless an employee makes an entirely independent decision to purchase 
them.”); see also Grote, 708 F.3d at 861 (Rovner, J. dissenting) (“[C]onsider that 
health insurance is an element of employee compensation. How an employee 
independently chooses to use that insurance arguably may be no different in kind from 
the ways in which she decides to spend her take-home pay.”). 
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system demonstrates, courts have failed to recognize the similarity of the 
contraceptive challenges to previous objections to social insurance 
schemes. 
Part A argues that the role the ACA ascribes to private employers bears 
striking resemblance to other comprehensive social insurance schemes, all 
of which have faced and survived challenges based on free exercise.  Like 
other social insurance, employer-based insurance is dependent on 
government support, enforced through the tax system, and administered 
and financed through employers.  Based on this analysis, as Part B shows, 
challenges to the regulation and structure of employer-based insurance—
including the current contraceptive challenges—should be analyzed within 
the doctrinal framework of previous religious objections to social 
insurance.  Part C applies this framework in light of the government’s 
compelling interests in comprehensive insurance, public health, gender 
equality, and religious freedom. 
A. Employer-Sponsored Insurance as Social Insurance 
Characterizing employer-sponsored insurance as part of a social 
insurance system—like social security insurance, workers’ compensation 
insurance, and unemployment insurance—makes sense if we look at how it 
is structured.  After the implementation of the ACA, employment-based 
insurance will function as a key part of a system of national health 
insurance.  Its regulation serves to improve coverage, both qualitatively (as, 
for instance, requiring preventive services) and quantitatively (expanding 
the pool of insured).  Like other social insurance systems, health insurance 
requires employers to administrate funding, contribute a share, and 
constitute a mechanism through which employees pay in.  As with social 
security, workers’ compensation, and unemployment insurance, employees 
ultimately make the entirety of the premium payment in the form of 
deferred wages.  Like other social insurance obligations, the employer’s 
duty to offer ACA-compliant insurance is implemented through the tax 
system.  Extensive government financing further shores up government 
interests in ensuring that employer-based insurance meets minimum 
standards. 
The U.S. health system today is fragmented across public and private 
programs with varying levels of coverage, care, and cost.  Approximately 
fifty-five percent of people (or 169.3 million people) access insurance 
through employer-based plans; another thirty-one percent do so through 
Medicare, Medicaid, or other public programs with five percent insured 
through private, non-group insurance, and the remaining sixteen percent 
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uninsured.107  The Affordable Care Act supports and builds on this public-
private system.  For the uninsured, it facilitates private market mechanisms 
through regulation and financing.108  Starting in 2014, the uninsured will be 
able, and in fact required, to purchase insurance and will be aided in this 
obligation through government subsidies and the development of state-
level exchanges where insurance companies will compete for their 
business.109  The ACA also provides incentives to states to expand 
Medicaid to reach a greater proportion of the poor.110 
In enacting the ACA, Congress anticipated that approximately half of the 
population would continue to receive health insurance coverage through 
their employers.111  The ACA encourages employers to extend insurance to 
their employees through the use of the so-called “employer mandate.”112  If 
any large employer—defined as having more than fifty full-time 
employees—fails to offer insurance to its employees, and its employees 
purchase insurance through the health exchanges with subsidies, it will be 
subject to a $2000 tax per full-time employee (minus the first thirty 
employees).113  The effective cost of insuring employees will thus be the 
total premium minus the penalty, which may encourage employers to keep 
or add health insurance over time.114 
The ACA also imposes new regulations and consumer protections on 
health insurance plans sponsored by employers.  Employers that offer 
unaffordable or inadequate coverage will pay a $2,500 tax for each full-
 107.  Emily Smith & Caitlin Stark, By the Numbers: Health Insurance, CNN (June 
28, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/27/politics/btn-health-care. 
 108.  See generally Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid Expansion Under the 
Affordable Care Act, 309 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1219 (2013); Mark A. Hall, Approaching 
Universal Coverage with Better Safety-Net Programs for the Uninsured, 11 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 9 (2011). 
109.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012). 
110.  Id. 
 111.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT ON HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE (Feb. 2013), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43900_ACAInsuranceCove
rageEffects.pdf (estimating that the number of nonelderly Americans obtaining 
insurance through their employer will fluctuate between 154 million people and 167 
million people in the next decade). 
112.  26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2006). 
113.  26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(1). 
 114.  KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE REFORM: SIX YEARS
LATER (2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/ 
2013/01/8311.pdf (“Evidence suggests employers have maintained coverage and 
benefit levels since the state’s implementation of health reform.”). 
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time employee who receives exchange subsidies.115  Of particular 
relevance, all plans must cover preventive care, including women’s 
healthcare like contraception, without cost-sharing.116  If its plan does not 
meet these requirements, an employer will face a $100 a day tax per 
employee and an annual tax assessment.117 
The government interest in regulating employer insurance plans is 
bolstered by its already substantial role in subsidizing such plans.  As 
Robert Field observes, “the government shapes, oversees, and indirectly 
funds the private market for employer-provided coverage” to an extent that 
“means that this product is not offered through a truly private 
mechanism.”118  Indeed, the federal government funds employer-sponsored 
insurance to the tune of $250 billion a year, representing one-third of the 
aggregate amount Americans pay for employer insurance and making it the 
third largest government financing program after Medicare and 
Medicaid.119 
After the ACA is fully implemented, Americans should be able to access 
affordable baseline coverage in a relatively uniform way, whether through 
employer-provided insurance or insurance purchased through an exchange. 
Although large employer-based plans are subject to fewer regulations than 
the individual and small group plans in the exchanges, the two are 
explicitly linked.  Under the ACA, all plans offered in the exchanges must 
provide “minimum essential coverage” that is equal to that offered by a 
“typical employer plan.”120  The employer-based plan, therefore, acts as the 
baseline for what can be considered adequate coverage after healthcare 
115.  26 U.S.C. § 4980D. 
116.  See supra notes 8-14.  
117.  26 U.S.C. § 4980D. 
 118.  Robert I. Field, Government as the Crucible for Free Market Health Care: 
Regulation, Reimbursement, and Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1709, 1712 (2011). 
 119.  CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX
EXPENDITURES IN THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM 14 (2013), available at 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43768_DistributionTaxEx
penditures.pdf; see also Christopher J. Conover, Government Share of Healthcare is 
Far Bigger Than Advertised, THE AMERICAN, Aug. 2, 2011, available at 
http://www.american.com/archive/2011/august/the-government-share-of-health-care-is-
bigger-than-advertised-health-fact-of-the-week; Field, supra note 114, at 1712 (citing 
Thomas M. Selden & Bradley M. Gray, Tax Subsidies for Employment-Related Health 
Insurance: Estimates for 2006, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1568, 1571 (2006)) (indicating that the 
tax subsidy amounts to 35.8% of premiums paid to private establishments). 
 120.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(1)(C) (2006); Ensuring the Affordable Care Act Serves 
the American People, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/factsheets/ehb-2-20-2013.html (last updated Aug. 1, 
2013).  
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reform. 
The regulation of employer-based insurance is characterized by gradual 
implementation, rather than immediate change.  Although several measures 
took effect immediately in 2010, most were rolled out over a period of 
years.121  Insurance plans offered to individuals and small groups will cover 
preventive services when the new exchanges begin to operate in 2014. 
From September 2010, group plans (typically sponsored by employers) 
also must offer cost-free preventive care, unless they are grandfathered.122  
Those employer-based plans that existed when the ACA was passed may 
be grandfathered, that is, exempted from some of the new regulations, 
including the preventive care requirement, until the levels of coverage 
provided or costs for employees change.123 
Granting grandfathered status does not undermine the government’s 
interest in comprehensive coverage, including preventive care.  In 
determining that the government cannot impose the contraception benefit, 
some courts contend that, “191 million Americans belong to plans which 
may be grandfathered under the ACA.”124  This number represents those 
who might theoretically have been covered by grandfathered plans in 2010. 
In actuality, however, many plans had already lost this status in 2010.125  
By 2012, when the first of these courts made this assertion, 71.5 million 
employees were covered by grandfathered plans.126  Grandfathering was 
purposely designed to ease the shock of rapid change, with the 
understanding that rates of grandfathering would decline each year.127  
 121.  Health Reform Implementation Timeline, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
http://kff.org/interactive/implementation-timeline/ (last visited June 23, 2013).  
122.  Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(b) (2012). 
 123.  42 U.S.C. § 18011 (2012); see also Def’s Resp. Br. at 26, Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 405 (2013), aff’d sub nom. 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
No. 13-114, 2013 WL 3845365 (3d Cir. July 26, 2013) (“[G]randfathering is not really 
a permanent ‘exemption,’ but rather, over the long term, a transition in the marketplace 
with respect to . . . the preventive services coverage provision.”). 
 124.  See Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1291 (2012); Monaghan v. 
Sebelius, 931 F. Supp. 2d. 794, 804 (E.D. Mich. 2013).  
 125.  KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY 190 (2012), 
available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/8345-
employer-health-benefits-annual-survey-full-report-0912.pdf (indicating plans that 
could have been eligible for grandfather status either changed the coverage of the plan 
or had deductible, co-payment, or employee premium payments that changed too much 
to maintain eligibility). 
 126.  Id. (noting that 48% of 149 million covered American workers were in 
grandfathered plans). 
 127.   KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 127, at 7 (reporting that loss of 
grandfathered status among large plans is occurring much faster than anticipated: 58% 
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Indeed, by 2013, the number of employees in grandfathered plans had 
dropped to approximately 54 million (or thirty-six percent of those who 
receive coverage through employment).128  Most plans will eventually 
become subject to the preventive services mandate as they make changes 
and, thus, lose their grandfathered status.129 
With the ACA’s reforms in place, the United States will have a national 
health insurance system run largely by, and through, the private sector and 
financed through a combination of public, employer, and employee 
funding.  Employer-based insurance will constitute the mainstay of the near 
universal insurance coverage that is the goal of the ACA.  Together, private 
employer-based insurance, public programs, and the individual exchanges 
will ensure a more adequately insured population that is better able to 
withstand the shocks of ill health.130  This public-private social insurance 
system bears striking resemblance to other social insurance schemes, all of 
which have withstood religious liberty challenges, as the next Part shows. 
B. The Contraceptive Challenge as Social Insurance Tax Resistance 
Our legal system has had little tolerance for objections to social 
insurance, especially when those objections come from entities or 
employers instead of individuals.  In crafting accommodations, legislators 
and courts often distinguish being required to contribute to social insurance 
from being required to accept or use it.131  Doctrine dictates that 
of firms offered a grandfathered plan in 2012, down from 72% in 2011). 
   128.    EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY 221, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2013), 
available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/8465-
employer-health-benefits-20131.pdf. 
 129.  Preservation of Right to Maintain Existing Coverage, 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(a) 
(2012). 
 130.  Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1596 (2011) (arguing 
that these three components will “distribute the risk of future healthcare costs among 
the U.S. population according to the share of applicable premiums and taxes paid by 
the subpopulations differentially assessed to finance them”). 
 131.  See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 n.12 (1982) (“We note that 
here the statute compels contributions to the system by way of taxes; it does not compel 
anyone to accept benefits.”); South Ridge Baptist Church v. Ind. Comm’n of Ohio, 911 
F.2d 1203, 1211 n.6 (6th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing employer paying into worker’s 
compensation from compelling “an employee of the church who entertains similar 
views as a matter of personal conviction to accept any of the benefits conferred by the 
workman’s compensation law”); Erzinger v. Regents of Univ. of California, 137 Cal. 
App. 3d 389, 392-93 (1983) (rejecting objection to student registration fee for health 
insurance because students were not forced “to use the student health service programs, 
receive pregnancy counseling, have abortions, perform abortions or indorse 
abortions”). 
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contributions to insurance fall into a zone of limited responsibility and, 
therefore, do not significantly burden religious freedom.  The challenges to 
the contraceptive mandate should be understood within this framework, as 
an affront to the administration of the social insurance system for 
healthcare. 
Until now, courts have consistently dismissed the burden imposed on 
religious objectors by insurance programs as both attenuated and justified 
by compelling government interests.  For example, individuals contested 
the ACA’s individual mandate on religious freedom grounds and lost.  The 
D.C. District Court found it important that the plaintiffs had a choice, much 
like employers challenging the employer mandate do here: they could 
either pay a tax or purchase the objectionable insurance.132  The court 
concluded that “Congress’s compelling interest—reforming the healthcare 
market by increasing coverage—applies to Plaintiffs, just as it applies to all 
individuals.”133  The court further held that the individual mandate is the 
least restrictive means of furthering that interest because “[i]n the absence 
of the requirement, some individuals would make an economic and 
financial decision to forego health insurance coverage and attempt to self-
insure, which increases financial risks to households and medical 
providers.”134 
Here too, employers have the option of paying a tax instead of offering 
insurance.  The choice is not binary as challengers to contraceptive 
coverage often claim.  Employers are not limited to either providing 
insurance coverage in violation of conscience or facing ruinous financial 
costs.135  Rather, a company has three options: (1) refuse to cover 
contraception in an insurance policy and pay a substantial financial cost 
(amounting to $100/day per employee and additional taxes); (2) decline to 
offer insurance and pay a smaller amount in the form of a tax penalty for 
 132.  Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 20 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011); see also Ahmed v. Univ. of Toledo, 664 F. Supp. 282, 288 (N.D. Ohio 
1986) (rejecting foreign students’ challenge to university’s policy of requiring 
international students to carry health insurance on the grounds that it was the least 
restrictive means to ensure against health costs). 
   133.   See Baker, supra note 130. 
 134.  Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 43; see also Liberty Univ. v. Geither, 671 F.3d 391, 
450 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (rejecting in brief institutional 
challenge that the employer mandate “compels them to violate their ‘sincerely held 
religious beliefs against facilitating, subsidizing, easing, funding, or supporting 
abortions’ and prohibits the University from ‘providing healthcare choices for 
employees that do not conflict with the mission of the University and the core Christian 
values under which it and its employees order their day to day lives’”). 
 135.  See Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No 1:2-CV-1096, 2012 WL 6845677, at *9 
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2012) (noting that the plaintiffs frame the choice in this way). 
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employees receiving exchange subsidies (a fraction of the cost of insurance 
coverage); or (3) offer insurance and cover contraception.  Neither of the 
latter two options constitutes a substantial financial encumbrance. 
Arguably, challengers to the contraception rule object to the payment of 
a tax rather than the coverage of contraception.  They neither want to pay 
the employer mandate taxes, nor do they accept the higher tax 
consequences of offering coverage without women’s preventative care. 
Their objections appear to fall within the long line of cases rejecting 
religious liberty objections to “the payment of taxes or penalties imposed 
due to a refusal to pay taxes.”136  In those cases, courts note the importance 
of implementing a uniform and mandatory system.  This system, they 
reason, does not prohibit exemptions, but rather leaves the responsibility 
with Congress to create exemptions “given particularly difficult problems 
with administration should exceptions on religious grounds be carved out 
by the courts.”137 
Courts have declined to create religious exemptions to nationwide 
programs with respect not only to income taxes, but also to the full range of 
insurance programs enforced through the tax code.  The leading case is 
United States v. Lee, in which the Supreme Court confronted the claim of 
an Amish employer to be free from obligations to withhold social security 
tax from employees and pay the employer’s share of social security 
taxes.138  As is relevant to health insurance regulation, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that the government interest is apparent because the social 
security system is nationwide and comprehensive.139  Like other insurance 
systems, “mandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality” of 
the program.140  As with the employer mandate under the ACA, the 
employer’s role is to contribute funds, collect contributions from 
employees, keep records, and transmit payment.141  The Court left the 
accommodation of religious objectors to Congress, holding that “[w]hen 
followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of 
choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of 
conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes 
 136.  Adams v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(compiling these cases). 
137.  Id. at 179. 
 138.  United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 252 (1982); see also Droz v. Comm’r, 48 
F.3d 1120, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a similar claim under RFRA by looking 
to Lee). 
139.  Lee, 455 U.S. at 258. 
   140.    Id.   
141.  Id. at 254, 258. 
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which are binding on others in that activity.”142 
Other employer-based insurance schemes generally have survived 
attacks by employers based on religious freedom.  Note that cases tend to 
involve religiously affiliated non-profit employers, which have a more 
substantial claim to religious objection to general statutory employer 
obligations than do secular, for-profit corporations.143  Despite this, by and 
large, their claims have been unsuccessful.144  For example, in applying 
strict scrutiny to an employer’s claim that contributing to unemployment 
insurance constituted a substantial burden on free exercise, the Oregon 
Supreme Court upheld the unemployment coverage obligation.145  The 
court underscored the importance of ensuring against “the cost that 
unemployment imposes on the discharged employee and on society.”146  
The court acknowledged the tradeoff between wages and insurance, saying, 
“[i]n actuality, the unemployment insurance taxes are financial burdens 
only in the same sense that the costs of employing paid workers at all are 
financial burdens.”147  The fact that employers had to administer the system 
in the form of posting notices, filing reports, and keeping records—in 
addition to contributing—did not render the burden on religious freedom 
unconstitutional.  The court found such requirements “no different in 
principle from a host of other secular regulatory requirements such as 
health inspections of cafeteria workers or kitchens, safety inspections of 
school buses, and licensing of drivers.”148 
Worker’s compensation is perhaps the most apt comparison to employer-
based health insurance.  Employers may either purchase private insurance 
or self-insure, as with health insurance.149  Worker’s compensation is 
142.  Id. at 261. 
 143.  See, e.g., Balt. Lutheran High School Ass’n v. Emp’t Sec. Admin., 490 A.2d 
701, 710 (Md. 1985) (“[T]here is such an affinity between those taxes and 
unemployment insurance taxes as to make Lee dispositive.”). 
 144.  Claims have only succeeded in rare circumstances where organizations can 
show they are operated primarily for religious purposes, rather than educational, 
administrative, or other purposes.  See Mid Vt. Christian School v. Dep’t of Emp’t & 
Training, 885 A.2d 1210, 1216 (Vt. 2005) (compiling cases which almost exclusively 
involve religious schools). 
 145.  Salem Coll. Acad., Inc. v. Emp. Div., 298 Or. 471 (1985); see also Koolau 
Baptist Church v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Rel., 718 P.2d 267 (Haw. 1986) (upholding 
application of unemployment compensation requirements to religiously affiliated 
school as an insubstantial burden on religion). 
146.  Salem Coll. Acad., Inc., 298 Or. at 486. 
147.  Id. 
148.  Balt. Lutheran, 490 A.2d at 713. 
 149.  PETER M. LENCSIS, WORKERS COMPENSATION: A REFERENCE AND GUIDE 75-
82 (1998).  In many states, there is a public option as well, with the state serving as 
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financed by premiums collected from employers, and “this cost is 
commonly understood to be borne in all or large part by employees in the 
form of foregone wages.”150  It too is a form of health insurance, ensuring 
that risks of healthcare costs attributable to occupational injury and illness 
are distributed across workers.151  Indeed, some anticipate that once the 
reforms of the Affordable Care Act are fully implemented, “workers’ 
compensation health benefits may be merged over time into the general 
employment-based health benefit system.”152 
Like other social insurance programs, worker’s compensation has 
withstood repeated claims that it impinges on the religious liberty of 
religious employers.  In considering one such case, the Sixth Circuit noted 
the government’s compelling interests in the solvency of the insurance 
system and the protection of workers and their dependents.153  Given these 
interests, the court concluded, as have others, that “where [religious] beliefs 
clash with important state interests in the welfare of others, accommodation 
is not constitutionally mandated.”154 
Of course, many in this long line of cases involve objections to any 
involvement in social insurance.  By contrast, challengers to the 
contraception benefit would say that they actually seek to provide 
insurance and only object to contraception.  At heart, however, as one 
judge stated, the objection strikes at the requirement “to fund a health 
payer.  ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.10 (1984). 
 150.  Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1594 (2011);  see also 
Jonathan Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided 
Insurance:  Lessons from Workers’ Compensation Insurance 4, 4 (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 3557, Dec. 1990) (“Empirical analysis of two 
data sets suggest that changes in employers’ costs of workers’ compensation insurance 
are largely shifted to employees in the form of lower wages.”); W. Kip Viscusi & 
Michael J. Moore, Workers’ Compensation: Wage Effects, Benefit Inadequacies, and 
the Value of Health Losses, 69 REV. ECON. & STAT. 249, 249 (1987) (noting research 
showing that “workers are willing to trade off additional wage compensation for higher 
workers’ compensation benefits”). 
 151.  Gruber & Krueger, supra note 150, at 5 (“Workers’ compensation laws require 
employers to secure insurance to provide a minimum level of cash payments and 
medical benefits in the event of work-related injuries and illnesses.”). 
152.  Baker, supra note 150, at 1595. 
   153.   See South Ridge Baptist Church v. Ind. Comm’n of Ohio, 911 F.2d 1203 (6th 
Cir. 1990). 
 154.  Id. at 1208, 1211; see also Big Sky Colony, Inc. v. Mont. Dept. of Labor & 
Ind., 291 P.3d 1231, 1234 (Mont. 2012) (rejecting objections of colony of Anabaptists 
organized as a religious corporation to participating in worker’s compensation scheme); 
Victory Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n, 442 N.E.2d 819, 822 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1982) (rejecting school’s challenge to maintaining worker’s compensation insurance). 
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insurance plan that covers many medical services, not just 
contraception.”155  Moreover, other challenges to social insurance schemes 
could be characterized as focused on a particular regulation or segment of 
the insurance scheme.  For example, the Amish employer in Lee also 
sought exemption because he objected to the particular structure mandated 
by legislation, rather than the notion of social assistance itself.156  The 
Amish simply demand a right to provide for their own in a way that does 
not comply with federal regulations.  Similarly, objectors to income taxes 
rarely resist the entirety of the tax system.157  Any particular individual 
claim might not be onerous or intrusive on the government interest. 
Nonetheless, courts recognize that accommodating individual objections to 
specific budget items would destroy the system as a whole.158 
Prior cases presented arguments that are virtually identical to those 
raised against the contraception benefit, claiming that paying into an 
insurance plan that covers objectionable medical care imposes a substantial 
burden on religion.  Consider Goehring v. Brophy where students at a 
public university objected to paying student fees to the university health 
insurance system because it covered abortion.159  The Ninth Circuit rejected 
the students’ RFRA claims and reasoned that “the fiscal vitality of the 
University’s fee system would be undermined if the plaintiffs in the present 
case were exempted from paying a portion of their student registration fee 
on free exercise grounds.  Mandatory uniform participation by every 
155.  Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 865 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
 156.  United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (“The Amish believe that there 
is a religiously based obligation to provide for their fellow members the kind of 
assistance contemplated by the social security system.”); see also Bethel Baptist 
Church v. United States, 822 F.2d 1334, 1336 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Bethel Baptist’s 
members oppose any governmental attempt to assume their religious responsibility of 
self-care or to dictate the means by which the Church shall discharge its provisional 
responsibilities to its members. In accordance with these beliefs, Bethel Baptist has 
since 1978 maintained its own private social program for care of employees.”). 
 157.  See, e.g., Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1969) (reviewing 
the claim of federal income tax payers seeking refunds for portion of taxes that went to 
finance war because “[t]o finance and pay for an activity is to participate in it” and they 
“conscientiously object to the war in Viet-Nam and claim exemption from participation 
in these military activities”); Crowe v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 396 F.2d 766, 767 
(8th Cir. 1968) (hearing a claim of a taxpayer objecting to income taxes that 
“contribute to the welfare of people who made no effort to support themselves”). 
 158.  See Autenrieth, 418 F.2d at 588-89 (“If every citizen could refuse to pay all or 
part of his taxes because he disapproved of the government’s use of the money, on 
religious grounds, the ability of the government to function could be impaired or even 
destroyed.”). 
159.  Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1295 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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student is essential to the insurance system’s survival.”160  Similar student 
claims have failed elsewhere.161 
Courts have disallowed other challenges to regulating the structure of 
insurance.  A religiously affiliated school, for example, was prohibited 
from limiting health insurance benefits to employees who are the “head of 
the household,” defined by the school based on its religious teachings to 
exclude married women.162  The highest courts of New York and 
California, two of the most populous states, both upheld the application of 
state contraceptive coverage mandates to religious organizations, including 
Catholic Charities.163  The Supreme Court of California determined that an 
exemption from contraceptive coverage “sacrifices the affected women’s 
interest in receiving equitable treatment with respect to health benefits.”164  
Applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded that no precedent existed for 
exempting “a religious objector from the operation of a neutral, generally 
applicable law despite the recognition that the requested exemption would 
detrimentally affect the rights of third parties.”165 
C. The Religious Liberty Analysis in the Context of Compelling Interests in 
a National Health Insurance Scheme 
As current litigation percolates through the legal system, courts should 
consider the contraception benefit within the ACA’s overarching goal of 
access to affordable, standardized health insurance in a non-discriminatory 
way.  Due to the wage-insurance tradeoff, employer-based health insurance 
functions more like wages to compensate the employee than like a gift, or 
freestanding payment, from the employer.  Any burden on the corporation 
or its owners is, therefore, mitigated.  Employees’ access to or use of 
unemployment insurance, worker’s compensation, social security, vacation 
days, or health insurance cannot substantially burden their employers. 
Moreover, the contraception benefit rule serves four compelling 
government interests.  First, compliance with the ACA’s comprehensive 
health insurance scheme, like other social insurance programs, is a 
160.  Id. at 1301. 
 161.  Erzinger v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 137 Cal. App. 3d 389, 392-93 (1983) 
(resisting payment of student registration fee for student insurance that covered 
abortion or pregnancy-related counseling). 
162.  E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 163.  See Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 7 N.Y.3d 510, 522 
(2006); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal. 4th 527, 566 
(2004) (holding that state contraceptive mandate withstood both the rational basis and 
strict scrutiny constitutional tests). 
   164.   See Erzinger, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1295. 
165.  Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc., 32 Cal. 4th at 564-65. 
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compelling governmental interest.  The government’s interest in these 
programs cannot be attained without widespread participation and 
compliance with this regulation.  The employer mandate—which functions 
as an incentive for employers to offer an adequate baseline level of 
insurance that reaches preventive care—is the least restrictive means to 
accomplish this goal. 
Second, increased insurance coverage for contraceptive care furthers 
national interests in public health.  In the United States, unintended 
pregnancy poses a serious public health problem.  Nearly half of 
pregnancies are unintended, a much higher rate than in comparable 
countries, due in part to barriers to contraceptive use.166  Unintended 
pregnancy, in turn, has adverse health consequences for both women and 
their children.167 
Third, ensuring women’s access to preventive services addresses the 
healthcare inequities that confront women in the United States.  Congress 
responded to evidence that women pay sixty-eight percent more in out-of-
pocket health costs as compared to men, in large part because they bear the 
costs of contraception and reproduction.168  Cost, however, was not the 
only concern.  Enhancing women’s control over their reproductive health 
was understood to allow women to pursue their professional and 
educational ambitions instead of having children when they are not 
ready.169 
 166.  Susheela Singh, Gilda Sedgh & Rubina Hussain, Unintended Pregnancy: 
Worldwide Levels, Trends, and Outcomes, 41 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 241, 245 (2010) (“The 
unintended pregnancy rate in 2008 in North America is much higher than those of 
Northern, Southern, and Western Europe”—48% as compared to 29-36%); Lawrence 
B. Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Unintended Pregnancy in the United States: Incidence and 
Disparities, 84 CONTRACEPTION 478, 484 (2011) (“[R]educing the unintended 
pregnancy rate requires that we focus on increasing and improving contraceptive use 
among women and couples who want to avoid pregnancy.  Increased use of long-acting 
and cost-effective contraceptive methods such as the intrauterine device (IUD) could 
play an important role in such an effort.”). 
 167.  See generally Jessica D. Gipson, Michael A. Koenig & Michelle J. Hindin, The 
Effects of Unintended Pregnancy on Infant, Child, and Parental Health: A Review of 
the Literature, 39 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 18 (2008). 
 168.  Rachel Benson Gold, The Need for and Cost of Mandating Private Insurance 
Coverage of Contraception, 1 GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUB. POL. 5, 5 (1998).   
 169.  See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: 
Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 819 
(2007) (“Control over whether and when to give birth is practically important to 
women for reasons inflected with gender-justice concern: it crucially affects women’s 
health and sexual freedom, their ability to enter and end relationships, their education 
and job training, their ability to provide for their families, and their ability to negotiate 
work-family conflicts . . . .”). 
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Fourth, the contraceptive benefit advances a thus-far-unaddressed 
compelling interest in religious liberty.  In analyzing and accepting RFRA 
claims against contraceptive coverage, courts understand religious liberty 
only to lie with the challengers.  This obscures the fact that the 
contraceptive rule permits each employee to make his or her own moral 
decisions about reproduction and health.  If the contraceptive challengers 
are successful, their employees effectively will not be able to access 
insurance that covers contraception.  They will not be eligible for subsidies 
for the exchanges.  Nor can they purchase insurance with pre-tax dollars, 
whereas premium payments through employment-sponsored insurance 
receive favorable tax treatment.170  For this group of employees, private 
insurance, in practice, will continue to be available almost exclusively 
through employment,171 much like social security, worker’s compensation, 
and unemployment insurance.  Due to these constraints, the contraceptive 
coverage mandate ensures that each employee (and his or her partners and 
dependents) can make decisions about contraceptive use based on his or her 
moral beliefs.  High costs and lack of coverage will no longer impede their 
ability to live out their own conception of the moral life.172 
In sharp contrast, legal acceptance of corporate conscience as an excuse 
for regulatory non-compliance subordinates the beliefs of employees to the 
owners of the corporation.  As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
exempting an employer from worker-protective statutes “operates to 
impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees.”173  Even with 
regard to religiously affiliated employers engaged in commerce, courts 
have been disquieted by this risk.  In reviewing its state contraceptive 
benefit, the New York Court of Appeals noted that “many of plaintiffs’ 
 170.  Mark A. Hall, Christie L. Hager & David Orentlicher, Using Payroll 
Deduction to Shelter Individual Health Insurance from Income Tax, 46 HEALTH SERV.
RES. 348, 349 (2011). 
 171.  See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY 190 
(2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/8345-
employer-health-benefits-annual-survey-full-report-0912.pdf (“Employers are the 
principal source of health insurance in the United States, providing health benefits for 
about 149 million nonelderly people in America.”). 
   172.    Simply making contraception available through the market was insufficient to 
accomplish these goals.  More than half of all women between the ages of 18 and 34 
have been unable to afford birth control, and many more women forego devices that are 
cost-effective in the long term, like intrauterine devices, because of the high up-front 
cost.  Survey: Nearly Three in Four Voters in America Support Fully Covering 
Prescription Birth Control, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/newsroom/press-releases/survey-nearly-
three-four-voters-america-support-fully-covering-prescription-birth-control-33863.htm. 
173.  United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). 
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employees do not share their religious beliefs” and decided that “when a 
religious organization chooses to hire nonbelievers it must, at least to some 
degree, be prepared to accept neutral regulations imposed to protect those 
employees’ legitimate interests in doing what their own beliefs permit.”174  
This precedent should suggest to courts that the strong public interest in 
“ensuring equal protection of the laws and protection of First Amendment 
liberties”175 rests, in these cases, with the government. 
There is no viable less restrictive means to carry out these compelling 
goals.  Challengers demand that the government directly provide and pay 
for contraception for employees whose employers block access to 
contraception through employer-based insurance.  Alternately, they insist 
that the accommodation for religious affiliated non-profits be extended to 
secular, for-profit businesses.  As previous religious liberty challenges to 
social insurance show, precedent supports neither claim.  Indubitably, the 
government could directly finance and deliver social security, worker’s 
compensation, unemployment insurance, and health insurance through 
general revenue, thus ensuring no burden on employers.  But the 
Constitution does not so require.  Similarly, the mere existence of 
exemptions for religious employers or non-profits does not require 
expanded accommodation. 
Situating the contraception benefit within the doctrinal framework of 
social insurance makes clear that religious challenges by employers should 
be rejected.  As courts have previously held, any accommodation of 
religious objections to social insurance is the responsibility of other 
branches.  In this instance, the Executive branch has accommodated 
religiously affiliated organizations and religious employers, while ensuring 
compelling interests in comprehensive social insurance, public health, 
gender equality, and religious freedom are nonetheless advanced. 
V. THE IMPACT ON HEALTH REFORM AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 
If the challenges to the contraceptive mandate succeed on the grounds of 
a business interest in religious observance, it will send shock waves far 
beyond contraception.  Most immediately, it will destabilize the reforms of 
the ACA.  The rights of employees generally, and of women in particular, 
 174.  Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 468 (N.Y. 
2006); see also South Ridge Baptist Church v. Ind. Comm’n of Ohio, 911 F.2d 1203, 
1211 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[T]o preclude some other employee not exercising such belief 
from the benefits of [worker’s compensation] merely because the Church itself opposes 
them or prefers to provide for them in a different manner, could not escape the 
prospective danger of denying that employee the equal protection of the state’s law 
merely because of the personal religious beliefs of his employer.”). 
175.  Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 998 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
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will be at risk. 
As courts engage in an expansion of corporate rights unprecedented in 
constitutional and statutory precedent, they act as though contraception is 
uniquely morally objectionable.  In crafting the contraception benefit rule, 
separate from other benefits that must be covered by employer-based 
insurance plans, the government effectively did so as well.  Under the rule, 
religious employers will only be exempted and religious organizations only 
accommodated with regard to contraception.  An employer will not, for 
instance, be granted regulatory accommodation of its resistance to other 
required women’s preventive services, such as counseling on sexually 
transmitted diseases. 
If an employer’s free exercise is unconstitutionally burdened by the 
regulation of health insurance coverage, employers could successfully 
dispute any mandated benefits.  For example, employers might contest 
coverage of sexually transmitted infection counseling and testing, which 
the ACA also requires, on the ground that only marital sex is moral. 
Unmarried pregnant women might similarly be denied mandated prenatal 
care.  Many employers might oppose covering the HPV vaccine based on 
the incorrect belief that it causes promiscuity176—just as some employers 
today maintain that emergency contraception causes abortion despite all 
scientific evidence to the contrary.177 
Although objections might be expected to center around reproductive 
and sexual health,178 required preventive care includes other services 
 176.  See, e.g., Alexandra Sifferlin, Cancer Rates Dropping, But Not for All Tumor 
Types, TIME (Jan. 8, 2013), http://healthland.time.com/2013/01/08/cancer-rates-
dropping-but-not-for-all-tumor-types/ (discussing parents’ objections to the so-called 
“promiscuity vaccine”); Robert A. Bednarczyk et al., Sexual Activity-Related Outcomes 
After Human Papillomavirus Vaccination of 11 to 12 Year Olds, 130 PEDIATRICS 798, 
805 (2012) (showing no increase in promiscuity three years after HPV vaccination). 
 177.  See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *4 (7th Cir. 
Dec. 28, 2012) (describing the plaintiffs’ contention that certain drugs and devices such 
as the “morning-after pill,” “Plan B,” and “Ella” come within the Mandate’s and 
HRSA’s definition of “Food and Drug Administration-approved contraceptive 
methods” despite their “known abortifacient mechanisms of action”); Alastair J.J. 
Wood, Jeffery M. Drazen & Michael F. Green, The Politics of Emergency 
Contraception, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 101 (2012) (“Levonorgestril [Plan B] does 
not cause abortion; it does not terminate an established pregnancy.”); Sheri A. Hild et 
al., CDB-2914: Anti-Progestational/Anti-Glucocorticoid Profile and Post-Coital Anti-
Fertility Activity in Rats and Rabbits, 15 HUM. REPROD. 822, 830 (2000) (showing that 
ulipristal [Ella] has the potential to prohibit implantation in rats and rabbits but finding 
no evidence of terminating an existing pregnancy).  
 178.  See Jessica L. Waters, Testing Hosanna-Tabor: The Implications for 
Pregnancy Discrimination Claims and Employees’ Reproductive Rights, 9 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 47, 73 (2013) (noting that “questions of sexuality and reproduction—
37
Sepper: Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014
340 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 22:2 
contested by some religions, such as depression screening and vaccination 
for adults and children.  As Judge Rovner of the Seventh Circuit said in her 
dissent, 
 [I]f an employer has this right [with regard to contraception], it is not 
clear to me what limits there might be on the ability to limit the 
insurance coverage the employer provides to its employees, for any 
number of medical services (or decisions to use particular medical 
services in particular circumstances) might be inconsistent with an 
employer’s (or its individual owners’) individual religious beliefs.179   
Employers could intrude on their employees’ privacy in order, for instance, 
to ensure that sexual assault victims, but no other women, have insurance 
coverage for emergency contraception. 
Objections to required services would seemingly not be limited to 
employers.  Insurance companies, religiously affiliated and secular, would 
appear to have a similar ability to raise religious freedom as a shield against 
the ACA’s insurance regulations.  Indeed, they play a much more direct 
role in the financing and provision of contraception than do employers. 
Such claims seem farfetched, but in some states, insurance companies have 
already demanded religious exemptions from state contraceptive coverage 
regulations. 
In general, if secular employers succeed in contesting the contraception 
mandate, it will open the door to objections to other regulations, 
undermining gender equality and religious freedom in workplaces of all 
kinds.  Religiously affiliated commercial actors already assert rights to defy 
health and safety laws, pay women less, and fire pregnant women.180  It 
would be a short step from recognizing that for-profit, secular employers 
can deny employees the use of benefits to purchase contested medical care, 
and allowing them to fire employees for using such medical care.181  That, 
particularly women’s sexuality and reproduction—are often conflated with ‘moral’ or 
‘religious’ issues”). 
179.  Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *7. 
 180.  See Forest Hills Early Learning Ctr. v. Lukhard, 728 F.2d 230, 243-44 (4th 
Cir. 1984) (noting that health and safety regulations applicable to sectarian child care 
center do not burden free exercise rights); Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 
290, 303-05 (1985) (applying the Fair Labor Standards Act to a non-profit religious 
organization does not violate the free exercise clause); Donovan v. Shenandoah Baptist 
Church, 573 F. Supp. 320, 325 (W.D. Va. 1983) (challenging the application of Fair 
Labor Standards Act minimum wage and equal pay provisions). 
 181.  See Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 994 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (noting 
the government argument that accepting challengers’ claims “would widen 
enormously . . . the scope of RFRA’s protection, providing owners of secular, for-profit 
companies the power currently reserved for religious organizations under Title VII to 
claim religion-grounded exceptions to federal laws”). 
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in fact, is precisely what we see in the context of religiously affiliated 
organizations.  For example, a Catholic-affiliated school terminated a lay 
teacher for requesting time off for in vitro fertilization treatment on the 
basis that IVF “is an intrinsic evil . . . which means no circumstances can 
justify it.”182  In line with several churches, some for-profit employers 
might determine that women should be paid less based on the belief that 
men are the heads of households.183 
In accepting that a corporation can successfully assert free exercise 
against the contraceptive mandate, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit recognized the far-reaching implications of corporate conscience. 
The plurality opinion identified Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the 
National Labor Relations Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act as 
potential targets of future challenges.184  As Judge Briscoe noted in the 
dissent,  
[I]f all it takes for a corporation to be categorized as a ‘faith based 
business’ for purposes of RFRA is a combination of a general religious 
statement in the corporation’s statement of purpose and more specific 
religious beliefs on the part of the corporation’s founders or owners, the 
majority’s holding will have, intentionally or unwittingly, opened the 
floodgates to RFRA litigation challenging any number of federal statutes 
that govern corporate affairs.185 
Ultimately, courts should be wary of religious freedom claims from for-
profit, secular corporations.  Current decisions characterizing the regulation 
of employment benefits as a substantial and unjustified burden on religious 
freedom on employers would have potentially radical consequences for 
employment regulation.  Acceptance of corporate conscience would invite 
challenges to health, safety, and nondiscrimination regulations in the 
workplace and beyond.186  It would put the institution in a legally superior 
 182.  Waters, supra note 177, at 64 (discussing Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-
South Bend, No. 1:12-cv-00122, 2012 WL 3870528 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 20, 2012)); see 
also Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., 680 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(describing that female teacher was terminated from her position at a “non-
denominational Christian school” because she had become pregnant prior to her 
marriage). 
 183.  See generally Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 
1990); E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986); E.E.O.C. v. 
Tree of Life Christian Sch., 751 F. Supp. 700 (S.D. Ohio 1990); Russell v. Belmont 
Coll., 554 F. Supp. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). 
184.  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., v. Sebelius, No. 12-6294, 2013 WL 3216103, *9-
*13 (10th Cir. June 27, 2013).
185.  Id. at *51 (Briscoe, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 186.  In a forthcoming paper, I refer to this development as “Free Exercise 
Lochnerism,” which revives business attacks on the regulatory state through religious 
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position to the individual and undermine the religious pluralism that we 
value in commercial and public life. 
CONCLUSION 
In litigation against the contraception benefit, courts have begun to 
accept a doctrine of corporate conscience.  In so doing, they ascribe 
religious liberty to secular, for-profit businesses.  As I have argued here, 
their analysis has four fundamental flaws.  First, it either grants directly to a 
legal fiction an inherently human characteristic or indirectly transfers 
shareholders’ beliefs to the corporation, defying a central premise of 
corporate law, that is, that corporations are separate from their owners and 
have different rights and obligations.  Courts have eluded difficult 
corporate law, religious liberty, and employment law questions that ensue. 
Second, the analysis ignores the structure and function of employer-based 
insurance after the Affordable Care Act.  Looking more deeply at the wage-
benefit tradeoff informs the alleged responsibility of the employer for the 
use or purchase of contraception.  Third, a further examination of 
employer-based insurance demonstrates that it shares characteristics with 
other social insurance schemes, like worker’s compensation and 
unemployment insurance, all of which have withstood religious liberty 
challenges.  Finally, any doctrine of corporate conscience risks health 
insurance coverage, safety regulations, and gender equality in workplaces 
of all kinds to the detriment of all employees. 
liberty arguments. 
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